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LITERATURE REVIEW

The Lieber Code: A Historical Analysis of the
Context and Drafting of General Orders No. 100
Alexander Mindrup1
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The University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA
ABSTRACT
During the American Civil War, the United States changed in dramatic fashion. The national crisis of the Civil War
encompassed all aspects of the United States. In 1862, a forward-thinking German American intellectual named
Francis Lieber lobbied the Lincoln administration to update the United States laws of war. On April 24, 1863,
President Lincoln issued General Orders No. 100 or “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United
States in the Field.” General Orders No. 100, better known as the Lieber Code, modernized the United States laws of
war. Not only that, but the Lieber Code traveled across the Atlantic Ocean and impacted European international and
military law for decades after the Civil War.
As a revolutionary document, the Lieber Code was an outworking of President Lincoln’s goals for the Union in the
Civil War. The Code answered vital questions regarding emancipation and how a massive, modern, biracial, and
volunteer army would wage a Civil War against rebellious states. The Lieber Code was often an unsung hero in United
States history outside of legal or military history, but upon closer inspection, the Lieber Code was a window into what
Lincoln and his cabinet believed about the Civil War. The Lieber Code embodied the answers to the moral, political,
constitutional, legal, and international problems that the Union faced. Since the Code played such a key role in the
Civil War, this paper investigates the historical and legal context of the Code as well as the drafting and impact of the
Code during and after the Civil War.
KEYWORDS: History; International Law; Law; Military History; Military, War, and Peace; United States History

On April 24, 1863, almost two years before the end of the
American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued
General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code. The Lieber
Code’s full name was “Instructions for the Government
of the Armies of the United States in the Field.” Francis
Lieber drafted the Code at the request of President
Lincoln’s General-in-Chief, Henry Halleck, in order to
regulate Union troops and establish doctrine on what was
permissible in war. The Code affected how the Union
prosecuted the war; and, after the conclusion of the war,
international powers used the Lieber Code as a template
for their own military regulations.
On a more practical scale, General Orders No. 100 was
both an outworking of the Lincoln administration’s
political strategy and a tool in its policies as the president
maneuvered the Union through the complex issues of civil
war, emancipation, and reconstruction. In light of such a
complex and rich history, this paper investigates the
historical context, drafting, and content of General Orders
No. 100.
The American War of Independence and the American
Civil War occurred relatively close together in the

chronology of United States military history, ending
within 85 years of each other. Although the antebellum
United States experienced political and cultural changes,
those changes were rooted in eighteenth century
developments and beyond.
Indeed, the War of
Independence was the crucible through which United
States policies and opinions on war began to crystalize.
American colonists in the eighteenth century assumed
that a common international law governed the nations.
The colonists functioned from the European-Christian
worldview that developed into what became known as
western thought. Prior to the development of eighteenthcentury Anglo-American international law, Europe
grappled with the concept of warfare. War was, by nature,
a conglomeration of violence, chaos, ambition, and
power; however, war was more than simple violence.
War was a power struggle between at least two belligerent
parties. Christian theologians and intellectuals sought to
understand how war was permissible in a worldview that
valued peace, goodwill, and self-denial. Since the ancient
times of Abraham and the pagan kings of Canaan, the
biblical narrative included war.
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The doctrine of “just war” developed out of this paradox.
The rudimentary theory of just war postulated that, in
each war, there was a belligerent side which fought for
just reasons and another side which fought for unjust
reasons. The theory assumed that war was a conflict
between good and evil. Right and wrong were relevant
values and if a belligerent nation was in the right, the just
war theory allowed that nation to fight its war. The just
war doctrine related to the Christian notion of justified
personal violence through self-defense. However, the
catch was “there could only be one just side in a war.”1
The whole matter of just warfare hinged upon the question
of which cause was just. Of course, if one side was
victorious, the victors claimed their cause as just.
Unfortunately, if a belligerent army believed its cause was
just, then it was unclear what limits the just war theory
should or could place upon a military’s actions. If both
belligerents believed they fought for a just cause, then
they could punish the evil actions of their respective
opponents with military force and retribution. However,
if the party which perceived itself to be wronged, lashed
out in reprisal at its antagonists, nothing restrained the
antagonists (the original perpetrators) from retaliating at
the retribution they received with further “justified”
violence. Each side believed itself to have the moral high
ground. Thus, any act of retribution was permissible to
punish the opposing “evil” belligerents and to bring about
the justice of one’s cause. Furthermore, in the pursuit of
justice, nearly any action was permissible so long as it was
“necessary” to achieving justice.2 The religious wars of
medieval Europe exemplified the dangers of such a
theory.3

2
and chess. Vattel prescribed that war was strictly between
the opposing combatants. The rules restrained war from
entering into retributive contests fueled by convictions of
justice which descended into greater and greater degrees
of bloodshed. Witt described this as “moral neutrality”
and “separating means and ends.”5 No matter how
righteous the end, the rules of war still limited the means
to achieving that end.
By the eighteenth century, Europe and the American
colonies accepted Vattel’s rules for conduct in war.
Enlightenment humanitarian constraints on war
established the parameters in which the infant United
States grew up. The doctrine of “civilized” or limited
warfare was the foundation upon which the United States
built its early military tradition.6
In the American War of Independence and the War of
1812 the United States utilized the Enlightenment’s
humanitarian framework for war.
Military and
international law developed in several ways in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; however, three
key debates between Great Britain, France, and the
fledgling United States were fundamental to the context
of the American Civil War. While the debates may have
appeared to be unrelated, they impacted the Lincoln
administration’s view of military law and formed the legal
context in which Lieber wrote General Orders No. 100.
The first debate dealt with free shipping, blockades, and
international naval law.

Enlightenment philosophers recognized the danger of this
medieval just war formula.
Witt described the
Enlightenment diplomat Emmerich de Vattel as capturing
the “new spirit of European warfare.”4 Vattel solved the
dilemma of which belligerent was acting justly by
severing the idea of justice from war entirely. Of course,
justice was mutually exclusive in war, and only one of the
belligerents could have been fighting a just war. But that
was unrelated to the practical application of military
power in war. For humanity’s sake, Vattel claimed
warring parties should set aside their convictions of
justice and wage war according to a strict set of rules. The
rules which Vattel set forth confined war to a gentleman’s
game, much like Benjamin Franklin’s comparison of war

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the United States’
naval power proved insignificant in comparison to the
European heavyweights of France and Great Britain.
Thus, as the United States economy expanded and private
trading vessels sailed across the globe, the United States
turned to international naval law to protect its private
interests abroad. When Great Britain and France fought
against each other, the United States attempted to tread
the thin line of neutrality. Britain and France routinely
seized vessels belonging to neutral nations if those vessels
sailed for the ports of their respective enemies. Many
times, those vessels were United States merchant ships.
Denying material goods from an enemy was an excellent
military strategy, but it did not appeal to United States
merchants or the United States government. The United
States questioned what right belligerent nations had to
seize and search ships flying the flag of a neutral nation.

John F. Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in
American History (New York, NY: Free Press, 2012),
17. The most important work on the Lieber Code was
Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History,
published in 2012 by John Fabian Witt, the Allen H.
Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law at the Yale Law
School. Witt explained at great depths the traditions of

United States military and international law and how the
Lieber Code affected those traditions.
2
Witt, Lincoln’s Code, 17.
3
Ibid., 16.
4
Ibid., 16.
5
Ibid., 18.
6
Ibid., 19.
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Furthermore, if a nation declared a blockade on another’s
port, it was unclear what responsibility a neutral nation
had to recognize that blockade.
A common saying in the United States was that “free
ships make free goods.” The saying summarized the goal
of United States international policy to establish neutral
shipping protections under international law; however,
results were slow. It was not until 1856 after decades of
arduous debate, that neutral shipping and the United
States mantra of “free ships make free goods” became
international policy. In the Declaration of Paris of 1856,
Britain, France, and several other nations “pledged that
neutral flags would cover enemy goods except for
contraband.”7 In addition, “neutral goods were not liable
to capture when found aboard an enemy vessel, and that
blockades had to be ‘effective.’”8 If European nations
went to war, international law protected neutral shipping
and United States merchants could continue trading
unmolested. The Declaration required neutral ships to
respect a blockade only if nations deemed the blockade to
be “effective.” The powers of Europe resolved the debate
44 years after the start of the War of 1812. Witt noted that
“the neutral rights principles for which the United States
went to war in 1812 seemed at last to have become the
governing rules for war on the high seas.”9 However, this
issue would surface again in 1861 with the advent of the
Civil War, except this time the United States was on the
opposite end of the issue. The recognition of neutral
shipping rights under international law, which the United
States had fought so hard for, no longer protected the
nation’s merchant fleet; it restricted the actions of the
United States Navy.
The second key debate of the 1776-1820 era centered
around slaves in wartime. According to Vattel’s civilized
rules of war, armies could not confiscate civilian property.
If armies did so, the rules of war required that armies
compensate civilians. American slaveowners believed
their slaves were property. As property, slaveowners
claimed that the international laws of war protected their
slaves from confiscation. United States chattel slavery
had the problem of identifying slaves as both property and
people, depending on the context. But the British military
viewed slaves as people they should free and not as
property they should protect. Thus, the British military
freed slaves and claimed their actions were in accordance
with the laws of war.
From 1776-1783 and from 1812-1815, British
commanders recruited American slaves to help them in
7

Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 133.
9
Ibid., 133.
8
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wars against the United States. In return for helping the
British, slaves could receive their freedom. United States
slaveholders protested that the British actions violated the
laws of war. Thomas Jefferson took such a position in the
Declaration of Independence where he decried the British
for “excit[ing] domestic insurrections amongst us.”10 The
Virginia State Constitution also accused King George III
of “prompting our negroes to rise in arms against us.”11
Jefferson and his fellow Virginian politicians believed
that slaves were private property and the laws of war
protected slaves from confiscation.
Furthermore,
Jefferson argued that it was against the rules of war for an
invading army to incite slaves to rebel against their
masters. John Quincy Adams took the same position after
the War of 1812 when he fought for British repayments to
United States slaveholders who lost slaves in the war.
Eventually, Great Britain capitulated to the United States’
demands and provided a lump sum to the United States
government.
The debate cemented the American tradition, in the
Declaration of Independence no less, that the laws of war
protected slaves as private property. Later in his life,
however, John Quincy Adams changed his position on the
status of slaves in wartime. Adams acknowledged that
slaves did not receive special protection under the laws of
war. Witt explained that Adams “would decide that the
laws of war gave armies and presidents and nations the
power to emancipate slaves in wartime.”12 While Adams’
position was in the minority at the time, his opinions
served as an omen of what was to come.
The third and final military law issue of the antebellum
era was how governments should treat rebellions and
whether they should grant prisoner of war status to rebels.
When the American colonies resisted against Great
Britain on April 19, 1775 at the Battles of Lexington and
Concord, the British government viewed the American
colonists as rebels and traitors. As such, American
militiamen and members of the Continental Congress
were under threat of death for treason. During the
American War of Independence, the British captured
many American soldiers. The question was whether the
captured soldiers were traitors or prisoners of war. The
law stipulated that the captured rebellious soldiers were
traitors, and that the British should execute them. In
reality, mass executions for traitors did not happen. Witt
explained that, “From the very beginning of the war,
Washington announced his intention to treat British
prisoners by exactly the same ‘rule’ the British adopted

10

Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence,
(1776).
11
Virginia Constitution (1776).
12
Witt, Lincoln’s Code, 78.

THE CARDINAL EDGE
for Americans in their hands.”13 Thus, the practical
outworking of British policy toward American prisoners
was not summary execution for treason. While the legal
rationale remained unclear since the Continental Army
was a rebellious army, the actual events of the American
War of Independence resulted in a workable solution in
the context. The British and American governments
captured and exchanged prisoners during the war, much
like two peer European nations would have done.
Executions did take place, but those were primarily for
spying rather than for treason. While this option was the
most practical path to choose for both the Continental
Army and the British, some legal ambiguities remained.
Nations only granted prisoner of war status to armed
combatants who fought for another nation engaged in
war. Thus, by granting prisoner of war status to American
soldiers, the British government implicitly recognized the
Continental Congress as a legitimate government. The
solution to this legal conundrum was not immediately
clear. While the practical policy that the armies observed
on the ground worked itself out, the unanswered questions
would resurface in the Civil War.
On March 4, 1861, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
inaugurated Abraham Lincoln as the sixteenth president
of the United States. The Civil War began one month
later on April 12 when Confederate forces attacked Fort
Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. With
the advent of the Civil War, two figures loomed large in
the development of international and military law. The
first was President Lincoln. Witt explained that “It is one
of the most enduringly striking features of the United
States’ greatest wartime president that he came into office
with virtually no prior experience of war.”14 But what
Lincoln lacked in experience, he made up in aptitude.
Although the president was ignorant regarding the laws of
war and foreign relations, he learned quickly and
assembled both a cabinet and a war department of
individuals who compensated for his lack of experience.15
With that team supporting him, Lincoln’s leadership was
critical in establishing Union policies in the midst of a
civil war. Even though Lincoln may have been an
unlikely candidate for president in 1860 and despite his
inexperience in war, the second major figure dealing with

13

Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 141.
15
Ibid., 142, 146.
16
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 43.
17
Aviam Soifer, “Facts, Things, and the Orphans of
Girard College: Francis Lieber, Protopragmatist,”
Cardozo Law Review 16, no 6 (1995): 2305.
14

4
military law in 1861 was similarly unlikely but no less
qualified.
Francis Lieber was born in Berlin, Germany on March 18,
1800. During his lifetime Lieber fought in two separate
military conflicts including the Battle of Waterloo and the
Greek War of Independence. Lieber experienced the
horrors of war and suffered wounds himself. The
romantic’s glorified image of war did not disillusion
Lieber, but he did believe that war was a stage upon which
men demonstrated the highest values of courage and
honor. War was neither all victories nor all medals, nor
an end in and of itself. Rather, the goal of war was to
achieve something for one’s own nation. In this view,
Lieber understood war to be what the military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz defined it as. Namely war was “a
duel on an extensive scale,” as both groups attempted to
exert their will on the other and “compel the other to serve
his will.”16
Under the pressure of an authoritarian Prussian state,
Lieber left Europe and immigrated to the United States,
longing to participate in United States academia. Lieber
was, if nothing else, a thinker and a writer. Law professor
Aviam Soifer stated that “Lieber was indeed always
scrambling, always proposing projects and looking for
work, always reading and thinking and investigating.” 17
Perhaps one of his most apparent qualities was his selfpromotion. Lieber maintained a wide correspondence and
became connected with several elites in the United States
hoping to use his learning and intellect in a professorship.
After years of searching and participating in reforms and
projects, he received a professorship position at South
Carolina College in 1835.
Over the next two decades he became a well-respected
intellectual and professor; however, he despised the
South. Lieber believed in the American ideals of freedom
and personal rights, especially the right of private
property. He possessed strong anti-slavery opinions but
kept them to himself. He did own slaves in South
Carolina but did so to assimilate into southern culture.18
Lieber was alone and uncomfortable in the South.
Although it was an intellectually productive time for him
at South Carolina College, he often journeyed north. The
politics of higher education in a slave state placed Lieber
18

Charles R. Mack and Henry H Lesesne, Francis
Lieber and the Culture of the Mind: Fifteen Papers
Devoted to the Life, Times, and Contributions of the
Nineteenth-Century German-American Scholar, with an
Excursus on Francis Lieber’s Grace. Presented at the
University of South Carolina’s Bicentennial Year
Symposium Held in Columbia, South Carolina,
November 9-10, 2001 (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 2005), 5.
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at a disadvantage.19 Despite his work, the college did not
grant Lieber a promotion. He resigned from the college
in 1856 and moved to New York in 1857, where he
received a professorship at Columbia College. When the
Civil War began, Lieber’s three sons joined the war.
Oscar, the oldest son, served as a Confederate officer
while Norman and Hamilton fought for the Union. Lieber
was 61 years old in 1861 and the aging professor longed
to act.20 Although he could not fight, he applied himself
to use his position as a northern intellectual to impact
public opinion and public policy on the war, presenting
himself and his ideas to members of Lincoln’s
administration. He was available for work, but the war
began with him on the sidelines. So Lieber lectured at
Columbia about the laws of war and continued
corresponding with his connections in Washington D.C.
With Professor Lieber still teaching in New York, the
Lincoln administration faced the issue of international
naval law on its own. In 1861, the War Department
developed its strategic plan for the war. The plan known
as the Anaconda Plan called for the military and economic
constriction of the South. The plan required the closure
of all Confederate ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts,
which created problems with Europe. Great Britain and
France both had economic interests in the South, with
their textile industries connected to the cotton empire of
the South. European interests created a complicated
minefield that Lincoln’s secretary of state, William
Seward, had to step through. At first, Seward toyed with
the idea of declaring the southern ports closed, but
European statesmen rejected this notion.21 If the Union
wanted to close its ports, it would face strong European
opposition, which was something the Lincoln
administration could ill afford. If the Union chose that
course of action, Europe would either submit to the
closure and lose economic profits or recognize the
Confederacy as an independent nation and treat the ports
as open.22 The latter option would have been disastrous
for the Union.

5
establish a blockade and implement the Anaconda Plan,
the Lincoln administration had to resolve the issues raised
by the 1856 Declaration of Paris.
President Lincoln’s policy declared that seceded southern
states were still a part of the Union. Disloyal rebels had
simply taken over the Confederate state governments. To
resolve the conflict, the Union needed to defeat the rebels
and reconstruct loyal state governments in place of the
disloyal ones. However, if the seceded states were still
within the Union, the United States would have to
blockade its own ports in order to implement a blockade,
which violated international naval law. In addition, the
1856 Declaration of Paris required nations to recognize a
blockage only if it was effective. Thus, in order for the
Union to close southern ports and for the Anaconda plan
to work, the United States Navy had to establish an
effective blockade over thousands of miles of coastline
with an inadequate fleet all while unlawfully blockading
its own ports.24 Despite the inconsistencies of blockading
its own ports, the United States government blockaded
them anyway. Many argued that the blockade declaration
recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent party to the
conflict and thus an independent government. While
these arguments had implications upon Lincoln’s longterm position of rebellious state governments within the
Union, in the short term it allowed him to implement an
effective strategy against the Confederacy. Declaring the
blockade allowed the Union to limit the flow of material
goods into the South while preventing European
interference in the Civil War because the blockade was a
policy that European powers knew and respected from the
Declaration of Paris.25 Ultimately, the Navy became large
enough to establish an effective blockade by the end of
the war.

Seward also proposed a blockade. As in 1812, the United
States Navy was small in 1861—too small to create an
effective blockade. However, given enough time, the
Union could create a fleet large enough to constrict the
Confederacy. A blockade would also deflect European
opposition because international law recognized
blockades and Great Britain had political interests in
maintaining the power of the navy.23 But, in order to

With the naval issue politically resolved, the Lincoln
administration implemented the Anaconda plan. As the
land war commenced, more issues began to develop.
Finally, the German born professor from New York was
able to lend a hand. Lincoln had to face a similar question
to the one which had plagued the British military in 1776.
It was unclear whether the Union could capture
Confederate troops as prisoners of war without
recognizing the legitimacy of the Confederacy or if
international law required the Union to treat Confederates
as traitors and separate from the laws of war. Some
people argued that the if the Union did recognize
Confederate troops as prisoners of war, the captured

19

21

Mack and Lesesne, Francis Lieber and the Culture of
the Mind, 5.
20
“Would to God”: Francis Lieber to Henry Halleck,
February 9, 1862, as cited in [John F. Witt, Lincoln’s
Code: The Laws of War in American History (New
York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 179].

Ibid., 143.
Ibid., 143.
23
Ibid., 144-145.
24
Ibid., 145.
25
Ibid., 146.
22
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troops could be immune from charges of treason.
Additionally, as the Union army advanced southward,
runaway slaves began coming to Union lines. Some
Union generals turned the slaves away, unwilling to
challenge the personal property rights of southern
slaveholders. Others treated the slaves as free in a type of
preliminary emancipation. Seward and Lincoln had
created a workable (though not legally watertight)
solution to the naval law questions. Professor Lieber
helped to answer the other two questions in the trifecta of
international military law: slavery and captured rebels.
In February 1862, Union and Confederate forces clashed
at Fort Donelson, Tennessee. Lieber heard that the
Confederates had wounded his son, Hamilton, during the
battle and so Lieber travelled west to find his son. While
searching for Hamilton, Lieber met Henry Halleck, the
Union general in command of the Department of the
Missouri. They developed a close friendship which
would be advantageous for Lieber in the months ahead.
In July 1862, Lincoln appointed Halleck to be his
General-in-Chief in Washington. As General-in-Chief,
Halleck addressed many of the legal questions the Civil
War raised about military law and corresponded with
Lieber regarding some of the issues. Biographer Lewis
Harley stated that “[Lieber] was frequently called to
Washington for consultation in the War Department.”26
In the summer of 1862, General Halleck commissioned
Lieber to research the use of guerillas in war and write a
proposal for how the United States should deal with
Confederate guerillas. Lieber’s argument created helpful
distinctions between classes of combatants and Halleck
strongly approved of his work.27

6
Frank Freidel further elaborated that Lieber wanted the
President to “appoint a committee to draw up a code
defining the acts or offences and in some instances stating
the punishment under the laws of war.”29 Lieber was
correct that a code would be valuable, but another reason
existed which Freidel did not mention when he discussed
the reasons for drafting a code. In addition to the apparent
need for a general codification to the laws of war, 1863
witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the Civil War.
On January 1, 1863, President Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation which declared all slaves in
Confederate held territory to be free. In April 1863,
African American men were serving in the Union army as
combat infantrymen. The inclusion of African American
men in the military as combat units carried massive
implications. The South refused to recognize African
American men as real soldiers and did not grant them
prisoner of war status. The Union had to respond when
Confederate forces refused to grant prisoner of war status
to African American troops and commenced selling the
captured soldiers into slavery. Thus, although the Lieber
Code was about military law and the conduct of United
States armies in the field, it was also about slavery and
Lincoln’s war goals. When the Civil War began,
Lincoln’s primary goal was to preserve the Union.30 But
after January 1, 1863 emancipation became the other
prominent war goal. When Lincoln expanded his war
goals to include emancipation, the second war goal
pointed to what the war had always been about, namely
slavery.

Lieber proposed to Halleck on multiple occasions that the
Union needed a strong codification of its policies and the
laws of war. The War Department had often constructed
its policies as the war progressed through the changing
landscape of Civil War military law. Many times, Union
generals adopted contradictory policies, such as the
policies regarding runaway slaves. Lieber argued “that
the President ought to issue a set of rules and definitions
providing for the most urgent cases, occurring under the
Law and Usages of War, and on which our Articles of
War are silent.”28 In his biography of Lieber, historian

Historians have debated the “genesis” of Lieber’s Code
and attempted to determine what Lieber’s governing
principle was when he wrote the Code. John Witt and
historian Matthew Mancini argue that slavery and
emancipation were prominent factors in Lieber’s
motivations.31 Other historians point to the preeminence
of preserving the Union or how the challenges of war
made the Code necessary. Historian D. H. Dilbeck
disagreed with Witt and Mancini when he said
“Emancipation-related concerns neither preoccupied
Lieber throughout the war nor primarily motivated him to
draft his code. He did not set out on a grand effort to
reenvision the laws of war for the age of emancipation.”32

26

29

Lewis R. Harley, Francis Lieber: His Life and
Political Philosophy (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1899), 148.
27
Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century
Liberal (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University
Press, 1947), 329.
28
Lieber to Halleck, November 13, 1862, as quoted in
[Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century
Liberal (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University
Press, 1947), 331].

Freidel, Francis Lieber, 331.
Thomas Mackey, (lecture, undergraduate seminar at
the University of Louisville on the American Civil War
and Reconstruction, Louisville, KY, April 2, 2021).
31
Matthew J. Mancini, “Francis Lieber, Slavery, and the
‘Genesis’ of the Laws of War,” The Journal of Southern
History 77, no. 2 (2011): 325-348.
32
D. H. Dilbeck, “‘The Genesis of This Little Tablet
with My Name’: Francis Lieber and the Wartime Origins
30
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Dilbeck went on to explain, “Lieber drafted General
Orders No. 100 in response to the ‘confusion of ideas’
about the laws of war revealed by how Federals handled
the issues of prisoner exchanges, guerrilla warfare, and
the parole.”33
While different historians qualified Lieber’s motivations
and emphasized one motivation over the other, the
Professor spoke for himself. Mancini cited letters where
Lieber described his motivations to be on both sides of the
debate. 34 Lieber never said that the two motivations were
mutually exclusive. He could and did combine multiple
motivations into his passion for the Code. Perhaps one
motivation was primary in his mind. In the language of
the Code, “To save the country is paramount to all other
considerations.”35 Regardless of the supremacy of his
goals, Lieber did have more than one goal when he set out
to write Union military regulations. Historian Richard
Shelly Hartigan balanced the issue well when he said
Lieber had a “desire to see his adopted country at peace,
unified, with all its members free” and “he set aside the
first of these goals to secure the latter two.”36
Thus, in order preserve the Union, ensure a free nation,
and return to peace, Lieber sought a military code of
conduct which preserved the Union, achieved peace
quickly, and applied to biracial armies. He had to
establish codes for how the United States would view its
soldiers, white or black, and how the United States would
expect its enemies to do the same.
In December of 1862, Halleck invited Lieber to come to
Washington to join a committee to create a code for the
United States Army. Lieber created the rough draft, and
after suggestions & revisions by the committee and
Halleck, the president approved the Code and issued it
from the War Department as General Orders No. 100 on
April 24, 1863.37 Lieber titled the Code “Instructions for
the Government of the Armies of the United States in the
Field.” Because of his initiative and primary authorship,
the Code was known as Lieber’s Code. When Lincoln’s
administration issued the Code, it represented the Union’s
of General Orders No. 100,” Journal of the Civil War
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33
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position on key matters regarding how it viewed and
fought the war. However, in writing General Orders No.
100, Lieber not only codified the Union’s positions on key
questions regarding slaves in wartime and who were
prisoners of war, but also established a new philosophy
regarding war and a prescriptive code which reflected that
philosophy. Witt argued in his book Lincoln’s Code, that
the Code should be “better thought of as Lincoln’s.” 38
Witt took this position because “the Union’s instructions
[rose] out of the crucible of slavery” and “it was Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation that required its production
and sent it out into the world.”39 Lincoln provided the
leadership and change which created the context of
emancipation. Lieber was responsible for codifying the
ideals of emancipation within the military regulations.
Thus, although Lieber was the author of the Code, Lincoln
played a foundational role in its creation.
Lieber wrote the Code in 157 short articles that described
what military law allowed and did not allow in war.
Equally important, however, was the fact that Lieber
included the rationale behind each prescription or
prohibition in the Code. Lieber divided the Code into ten
sections. Each section dealt with a specific category of
military law.
Section I addressed martial law, military jurisdiction,
military necessity, and retaliation. The section was vitally
important for three reasons. First, Lieber laid out the three
principles which governed military power: justice, honor,
and humanity.40 War was a competition between powers
that could be brutal, but the Code required nations to wage
war justly, honorably, and humanely. Second, Lieber
defined the most important factor to examine in war. In
Article Five he wrote “To save the country is paramount
to all other considerations.”41 This statement was a strong
reflection of Lincoln’s first war goal to save the Union.
Third, in Articles 13 through 16, Lieber described the test
of military necessity.42 A military action was necessary if
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it achieved the goal of preserving the Union or “sav[ing]
the country.”43
Lieber’s doctrine of military necessity received criticism
in the nineteenth century. Law professor Burrus
Carnahan, in his article reviewing the doctrine of military
necessity, described how the Confederacy condemned the
doctrine of military necessity because it could be “a
License for Mischief.”44 The Confederacy feared that any
Union military action would be justifiable because it was
“necessary.” Carnahan described how this happened in
World War I when Germany used the doctrine of
necessity to justify its actions; however, Carnahan noted
that “Lieber’s principle of military necessity had evolved
there into the doctrine of Kriegsraison, which permitted
the German army to violate many of the laws and customs
of war on the basis of military necessity.”45 Carnahan’s
point was that, even if the Confederacy condemned the
doctrine of military necessity and the German army
abused it, that was not the original intention of Lieber’s
Code and his view of military necessity. The principles
of justice, honor, and humanity governed military
necessity. Military necessity must and could not have
been a blank check for an army to take whatever action it
desired. On the other hand, military necessity did mean
that war could and would be violent and tragic. Lieber
believed some things in war were never necessary
because they were not just, honorable, or humane. Such
things included the use of torture and poisons.46 But other
times, some things were necessary, as long as they were
just, honorable, and humane. The ultimate concern was
to win the war. Lieber’s conclusion to Article 29 followed
this logic when he wrote the remarkable words, “The
more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for
humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”47
Section II dealt with the protection of private property and
private persons as well as public works of art and science.
Lieber mandated the protection of private property even
in war, but there were two important exceptions. The first
was if military necessity required the seizure of private
property. The second was if the private property was a
slave. In that case, Lieber made a strong defense which
drew heavily from Lord Mansfield’s decision in Somerset
vs. Stewart in 1772 which established that only positive
law could hold a person as a slave and once that person
reached free land (or free jurisdiction under the United
States military), that person was free, and no one could
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return them to slavery.48 This argument was a powerful
tool to carry out Lincoln’s second war goal of
emancipation. Under Section II, any slave who fled to the
United States Army was thereby free.
Section III handled deserters, prisoners of war, hostages,
and booty on the battlefield. The key articles built on the
emancipation argument of Section II and stated that “The
law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an
enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any
captured persons of their army, it would be a case for the
severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint.”49
The statement protected the African American soldiers in
the Union military and gave the War Department power
to address the actions of the Confederacy.
Section IV codified the War Department’s policy on
guerilla warfare and the different categories of
combatants which Lieber had submitted to General
Halleck in 1862. Section V established rules for spies,
traitors, and those who otherwise acted outside of the
realms of justice, honor, and humanity. The latter
category included belligerents who abused flags of truce.
The Code dealt with anyone who violated those principles
in the strictest terms. Section VI elaborated on prisoner
exchange, flags of truce, and flags of protection. Section
VII clarified prisoner exchanges by outlining the Union’s
position on parole.
Section VIII listed rules for armistice and capitulation.
Section IX outlawed assassination. Like poisons and
torture, assassination was illegal in war. Section X
defined insurrections, civil wars, and rebellions. It was
worth noting that, although each of the three definitions
were distinct, the Code defined the secession of the South
and the American Civil War, as an insurrection, civil war,
and rebellion simultaneously.
Article 149 stated,
“Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their
government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of
its laws, or against an officer or officers of the
government.”50 Article 150 defined civil war as “war
between two or more portions of a country or state, each
contending for the mastery of the whole, and each
claiming to be the legitimate government.”51 According
to Article 151, rebellion was “applied to an insurrection
of a large extent, and is usually a war between the
legitimate government of a country and portions or
provinces of the same who seek to throw off their
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allegiance to it, and set up a government of their own.”52
Under Section X of General Orders No. 100, the
Confederate States were guilty of all three charges.
Article 155 and Article 157 were the two final articles of
importance in Section X. Article 155 divided the United
States’ enemies in war into combatants and noncombatants.53 The Code stipulated that, while they were
both enemies, the Union army should not treat both
classes the same. There were special protections for both
as according to their actions. However, it is imperative to
note that non-combatants were not simply noncombatants. They were non-combatant enemies. The
Code defined both combatants and non-combatants as
enemies. Because non-combatants were enemies, the
Code included them in the general sufferings of war.
According to General Orders No. 100, the enemy was not
solely the infantryman across the field, but the enemy was
also the farming family who supported the soldier from
the home front. In order to save the country, the Union
had to defeat both. Lastly, Article 157 stated that “Armed
or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States
against the lawful movement of their troops, is levying
war against the United States, and is therefore treason.”54
The final article of the Code established that resistance by
a citizen of the United States was unlawful and treason.
On April 24, 1863, Lincoln issued and distributed the
Code to both the Union army and the Confederacy.
Harley described the Code as “obligatory upon all the
armies of the United States.”55 The immediate impact of
the Lieber Code upon the Civil War was that it established
the Union army’s policies on how it would fight the war.
The Code impacted prisoner exchanges, provided a
standard for Union soldiers’ behavior, and defined the
enemy and who would or would not receive certain
privileges such as prisoner of war status. Law professor
Jordan Paust stated that “The Code undoubtedly lessened
human suffering during the Civil War, and it formed an
authoritative exposition of the laws of war for prosecution
of soldiers and civilians then and for years to come.”56 In
the bloodiest war in United States history, anything which
limited human suffering proved a praiseworthy
accomplishment.
When Lieber wrote General Orders No. 100 in 18621863, it served as a seminal work. Historians from the
twenty-first century had the difficult task of endeavoring
to enter into Professor Lieber’s context and accurately
discern what his intentions were in writing the Code. The
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context of two world wars, a cold war, and a war on terror
could tempt twenty-first century historians and lawyers to
glorify the humanitarian aspects of Lieber’s Code. It was
true that General Orders No. 100 did place some
remarkable restraints on the United States army.
However, the same man who wrote the General Orders
No. 100 also advocated for a fierce, “sharp war.”57 It was
imperative that lawyers, politicians, historians, and
military service members understand the proper context
of the Lieber Code and not overemphasize either the
humanitarianism or the ferocity of the Code in an
imbalanced manner. Harley wrote his work on Lieber
prior to the First and Second World War. Harley
published his book the same year as the first Hague
Convention in 1899. His perspective on General Orders
No. 100 was helpful to understand the Code from a
nineteenth-century context. Harley wrote, “Throughout
the code, two leading ideas prevail; the one, a desire to
save even our enemies from unnecessary injury and
destruction; the other, the necessity of displaying the
greatest energy in the conduct of war, so as to speedily
bring hostilities to an end, and restore conditions of
peace.”58 Lieber himself balanced both Vattel and
Clausewitz. According to Hartigan, he remedied the “gap
between theory and practice” that Vattel and Clausewitz
each presented in turn.59
From the strategic perspective, the Code laid forth a just,
honorable, and humane path through war that sought to
limit unnecessary suffering and preserve human life and
culture. At the same time, however, the Code embodied
a belief that war had a goal, and nothing was more
important that accomplishing that goal. For Lincoln, that
primary goal was preserving the Union. After January 1,
1863, the second goal was to emancipate slaves. The
Code enabled the Union army to fight for both of those
goals. If a military action was necessary to accomplish
those goals and it was just, honorable, and humane, it was
legal in war. The Code did not sanction unnecessary
suffering. But the Code did allow for hard, sharp, extreme
suffering if it was necessary. Lieber argued through the
Code that sharp (or harsh) wars were short, and short wars
were more humane because they reduced overall
suffering.
Politically and militarily, the Code helped the Lincoln
administration pursue a vigorous policy of reunification
and emancipation. The Code proved an essential key in
protecting the African American soldiers of the United
States Army. While the Code did not prevent horrible acts
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of violence against African American soldiers, it was still
an integral part of Union military policies. By having a
clear published standard of how the Union army and its
enemies should act, the Union could punish any violations
of those standards according to a predetermined code.
The Code laid out the path by which the Union could and
would retaliate against illegal acts in wartime. Thus,
while the Code did not physically protect African
American soldiers, it gave the Union the legal
ammunition to respond to its policies of utilizing African
American soldiers in combat.
Socially, the Lieber Code redefined the status of former
slaves, at least while they were in the army. The scheme
of master-slave race relations no longer defined African
American men. If they were in the army, they were
soldiers, although not yet fully equal to white soldiers.
Another cultural impact of the Lieber Code was that it
further strengthened the position military law had in
United States constitutionalism.
United States
constitutionalism sought to protect liberty while
restricting power, and military might was the epitome of
power. The Lieber Code enabled a vigorous military to
take the necessary actions to save the country, while
simultaneously restraining that power under the
Commander-in-Chief and the United States Constitution.
The effects of General Orders No. 100 did not restrict
themselves to the United States. Internationally, the
Lieber Code was the foundation to several aspects of
military law through the Second World War. Several
European nations adopted the Code or versions of it as
their military regulations. The Code’s stipulations on
acceptable war tactics influenced international law such
as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. However,
Paust reminded historians that the Code did not apply
solely to international warfare.60
In addition to
international wars, the Code applied to civil wars, wars of
insurrection, and United States conflicts with Native
Americans.61 Thus, the influence of Lieber’s Code
reached much further than either international wars or
civil wars.
Ultimately, the Code was not only a codification of rules
of war. Lieber and Lincoln together redefined the way
western culture thought about war. Vattel’s idea of a
morally neutral war did not apply to the American Civil
War. Law professor David Kennedy stated that “Vattel
wrote for those, like Franklin, who aspired to be wise
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statesmen for nations participating in an established
international order – not those who wished to
revolutionize that order.”62 The Civil War was an
unorthodox war between a Union and rebellious
insurgents within it, rather than between two independent
nations.
For Lincoln, the Civil War was a just war, and he could
not separate justice from the goals he pursued. He
believed that preserving the Union was a divine task.
Lincoln fought the Civil War on moral terms; however,
he did not revert to the early European notion of just war
which Vattel had rejected. Lincoln would not say he was
absolutely justified in his moral position. 63 Lincoln
claimed that only God knew what was the right course of
action, but as best Lincoln knew, he was doing what was
right and thus, he decided to press forward to achieve his
goals.64 Witt succinctly described Lincoln’s vision as an
attitude of “resolve and humility.”65 President Lincoln
said it best; “With malice toward none; with charity for
all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the
right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind
up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have
borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to
do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting
peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.”66 That was
the true legacy of the Lieber Code. Captain James Garner
stated that “the moral and humanitarian principles” of the
Code “balance the notions of military necessity and those
of humanity in order to (1) protect both combatants and
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, (2) safeguard
fundamental human rights of those who fall into the hands
of the enemy, and (2) facilitate the return of peace.”67
With these three goals in mind, the Lieber Code
represented harsh justice, yet, other times, considerate
humanitarianism. The Code focused on the goal of
preserving the Union; its true vision, however, was lasting
peace.
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